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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROTECTION
OF THE OCEANS FROM POLLUTION
LUDWIK A. TECLAFF*
We believe that the damage done to the ocean in the last 20 years is somewhere
between 30 per cent and 50 per cent, which is a frightening figure....
In publication, in conferences, in international units the matters are generally divided
into air pollution, land pollution and water pollution. In fact, there is only one pollu-
tion because every single thing, every chemical whether in the air or on land will end
up in the ocean.'
I. FREEDOM OF THE SEA AND POLLUTIONA LTHOUGH there has been localized concern with the problem of
pollution since at least the sixteenth century,' the recognition of
water pollution as a problem of global dimensions is of relatively recent
origin and is only now beginning to find legal expression.' It would seem
* Professor of Law, Fordham University. Dr. Teclaff received his Mag. Jur. from the
Polish School of Law, Oxford University, his M.S. from Columbia University, and his LL.M.
and J.S.D. from New York University. He is a consultant for the Water Resources Section,
Resources and Transport Division of the UN and has been a co-director of the Marine En-
vironment Legal Research Project for the New York University Law Center since 1967. Dr.
Teclaff is a member of the International Law Association, the American Society of Interna-
tional Law, the American Association of Law Libraries, and the International Water Law
Association.
1. Cousteau, Our Oceans Are Dying, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1971, § 4 (News of the
Week in Review), at 13, col. 3.
2. The history of pollution laws in England, for example, dates back to the City Air
Corruption Act, 12 Rich. 2, c. 13 (1388). The reign of Henry VIII was notable for a num-
ber of anti-pollution measures enacted between 1531 and 1543. E.g., An Act for the Preserva-
tion of the River Severn, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 9, §§ 1, 2, 6 (1542-43) (attack on the dumping
of ballast and rubbish from vessels in navigable waters); Bill for the Preservation of the
Havens in Devon and Cornwall, 27 Hen. 8, c. 23 (1535) (measures aimed at preventing
the Cornish and Devon ports from being choked with tin mining debris); Bill for the
Preservation of the River Thames, 27 Hen. 8, c. 18 (1535) (fine of 100 shillings for pol-
luting the Thames); Bill of Sewers, 23 Hen. 8, c. 5, § 3 (1531) (commisioners of sewers
given the duty, inter alia, of keeping sewers and ditches dean).
3. It is only within the last 15 years that the International Law Institute and the
International Law Association, the two major associations of international lawyers, have
dealt comprehensively with the pollution of international streams. See 49 Annuaire do
l'Institut de Droit International (II) (Ann. Inst. dr. ) 370-73 (1961); Comm. on the Uses
of the Waters of Int'l Rivers, Int'l Law Ass'n, Report of the Fifty-Second Conference 478
(1966). The formulation of rules of global application must await the 1972 Conference on
the Human Environment and the 1973 Conference on the Law of the Sea. Marine poflu-
tion has been suggested as one of the major items on the agenda of the 1972 Conference.
See Comm. on Intl Environmental Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Pub. No. 8603, Suggestions
Developed Within the US. Government for Consideration by the Secretary General of
the 1972 UN Conference on Human Environment 52 (1971).
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that the regulation of pollution must wait until the value of the inter-
ests adversely affected substantially outweighs the convenience of a body
of water as a dumping place for refuse. If this is so, it would at least
partly explain why international solutions have lagged behind domestic
ones, why the first conventional anti-pollution rules concerning the oceans
did not appear until the middle of the twentieth century, and why no
specific customary rules in this field have ever emerged. Although the
actual volume of the oceans is very small in comparison to the volume
of the earth, the seas do cover more than two-thirds of the earth's sur-
face.4 It is little wonder, therefore, that until man reached the present
level of industrial civilization he did not perceive that any of his activities
could produce detrimental changes in the composition, content, or quality
of seawater.
Until specific customary rules do emerge the only limitations on pol-
lution, apart from conventions, must be sought in or deduced from rules
regulating the use of the oceans in general. Pollution of the sea is not it-
self a use-it is a modality or consequence of a use. As such, it is a
factor which can make any use permissible or impermissible. Even if a
use becomes accepted and established, it cannot be exercised without re-
gard to the welfare of other users. Thus, under the theory that only
recognized uses of the sea are permissible,' pollution resulting from any
4. Council on Environmental Quality, Ocean Dumping, A National Policy il (1970).
5. Article 2 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas perhaps unwittingly embodies
this view, since it requires that uses of the sea other than the four enumerated freedoms
of navigation, fishing, laying submarine cables and pipelines, and flying over the high seas
be recognized by the general principles of international law. Only approved uses would
then be allowed and since the convention does not define the general principles of inter-
national law, the conclusive test of approval would be evidence that a particular use and
the mode of its exercise have become a rule of customary law. Convention on the High Seas,
done April 29, 1958, [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.IA.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (hereinafter
cited as Convention on the High Seas].
Professor Bos, although rejecting this interpretation of article 2, admits its possibility by
saying: "Ma seconde observation se rapporte au fardeau de la preuve que cette interpretation
imposerait A quiconque voudrait soutenir rexistence d'une libert6 additonelle. Vollh un
aspect vraiment inquiztant de cette faqon de voir, aspect revenant A une interdiction de
toutes activit~s en haute mer dent on serait incapable de prouver ]a reconnaissance par
les principes g~n6raux du droit international. La libert6 de ]a haute mer seralt ainsl r~dulte
h des liberts prouvies." Bos, La Libert6 de la Haute Mer: Quelques Problmes d'Actuallt6,
12 Netherlands Int'l L. Rev. 337, 344 (1965) (italics omitted). Similarly, the Netherlands
government, in the controversy concerning pirate broadcasting, came close to this view by
distinguishing between protected and non-protected uses. The view of the Dutch government
has been summarized as follows: "Limitations on the exercise of the four classic freedoms are
not easily to be presumed but may result from specific .provisions contained in the Geneva
and similar conventions. The views of the Government seem to imply that the exercise of the
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one of these uses would be prohibited if it unreasonably interfered with
other uses or users of the oceans.0 Similarly, under the theory that permits
any uses of the oceans as long as they are exercised in a reasonable
fashion for peaceful purposes,7 there must come a point when the detri-
mental effect of pollution reaches a level which condemns that use or its
exercise as unreasonable. However, a great deal of pollution might be
permissible before such a point is reached if the detrimental effect of
a use, no matter how substantial, is outweighed by other considerations,
such as defense. When the immediate political fate of a nation is weighed
against the future of the human species, uses concomitant with political
survival, even though they threaten the long-term existence of mankind,
may win acceptance as reasonable.
More pollution would seemingly be allowable under the open-ended
reasonableness theory than under the recognized-use theory, since more
uses would be permitted. Obviously, neither theory gives an a priori
criterion for deciding if and when changes in water quality should be
prohibited. Such a criterion must be ascertained in each particular in-
stance.
It is doubtful whether a more precise criterion could be obtained by
examining local water pollution rules in the major legal systems for the
purpose of establishing the existence of a general principle of law and
hence a principle of international law regarding pollution of waters.
This is due to the fact that in municipal law the detrimental effect of
changes in water quality is in many instances weighed against other
redeeming factors before the activities producing this effect are con-
demned.8 On the other hand, if it could be shown that any change in
other recognized freedoms is subordinate to the classic freedoms, as may be seen from
Articles 4 and 5 (par. 1) of the Convention on the Continental Shelf. As far as still other
uses of the high seas are concerned, their permissibility under international law should be
judged by their utility for, or interference with, the traditional uses of the high seas and
by the test of reasonableness." van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, Legal Aspects of Pirate
Broadcasting, 60 Am. J. Int'l L. 303, 314 (1966) (footnote omitted).
6. See, e.g., the statement of the International Law Commission in its commentary to
article 27 of the final draft of its convention on the law of the sea. Report to the General
Assembly, [1956] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 253, 278, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956) [hereinafter
cited as Report on the Law of the Sea]. See also Convention on the High Seas, art. 2.
7. A strong case for reasonableness as a test of permissible use of the oceans has been
made. M. McDougal & W. Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans 757-63 (1962) [herein-
after cited as McDougal & Burke]; McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the Inter-
national Law of the Sea, 49 Am. J. Int'l L. 356 (1955). This view was accepted in Profes-
sor Franqois' report on the regime of the sea to the International Law Commission. See
Report on the Regime of the High Seas and Regime of the Territorial Sea, [1956] Y.B. Int'l
L. Comm'n 1, 10, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/97 (1956).
8. For example, in those states of the United States (mostly east of the Mississippi)
1972]
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water quality detrimental to health, property, or the marine environment
is altogether incompatible with freedom of the seas, then a really precise
rule would emerge in international customary law. The International
Law Commission could perhaps be interpreted as urging the prohibition
of any degree of pollution when it stated in a comment to article 27 of
its final draft convention on the law of the seas: "States are bound to
refrain from any acts which might adversely affect the use of the high
seas by nationals of other States."0 The commission's statement, however,
being in the form of comment, has no more than persuasive effect and
cannot be taken as an expression of law. Efforts to transfer it to the text
of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas were unsuccessful.
Article 2 of that convention stated in its final paragraph:
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general principles of inter-
national law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the interests of
other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas.10
The convention thus falls back on the test of relative unreasonableness
in order to determine whether a use is permissible or not. It would seem
that the effort to interpret the meaning of freedom of the seas for the
purpose of finding rules bearing on pollution leads either to almost total
permissiveness or total prohibition. International customary law at its
present level of development is thus an unsatisfactory tool for controlling
pollution of the oceans. The task must be left to the conventions.
II. ANTI-POLLUTION CONVENTIONS
As the twentieth century entered its third decade, with vast increases
in the use and the carriage of oil in waterborne transportation, oil slicks
became a noticeable feature of ocean waters. The United States, which
which follow the reasonable use version of the riparian theory, pollution is only a factor
which determines the reasonableness of use. See, e.g., Montgomery Limestone Co. v. Bearden,
256 Ala. 269, 54 So. 2d 571 (1951); Roughton v. Thiele Kaolin Co., 209 Ga. 577, 74 S.E.2d
844 (1953); Ravndal v. Northfork Placers, 60 Idaho 305, 91 P.2d 368 (1939); Satren v.
Hader Co-op. Cheese Factory, 202 Minn. 553, 279 NAV. 361 (1938); Kyser v. New York
Cent. R.R., 151 Misc. 226, 271 N.Y.S. 182 (Sup. Ct. 1934); Sumner v. O'Dell, 12 Tenn.
App. 496 (1930). The Restatement of Torts states this rule generally: "Unless he has a
special privilege, a riparian proprietor on a watercourse or lake who, in using the water
therein, intentionally causes substantial harm to another riparian proprietor thereon through
invasion of such other's interest in the use of water therein, is liable to the other in an
action for damages if, but only if, the harmful use of water is unreasonable in respect to
the other proprietor." Restatement of Torts § 851 (1939). The rule is further stated: "A
riparian proprietor's use of water is unreasonable, under the rule stated in § 851, unless
the utility of the use outweighs the gravity of the harm." Id. § 852.
9. Report on the Law of the Sea 278.
10. Convention on the High Seas, art. 2 (emphasis added).
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was the first nation to realize the dangers of oil pollution, had pressed for
a radical solution that would altogether prohibit oil discharge from ships!'
It was hopelessly ahead of its time. The conference which convened in
1926 in Washington, D.C., on the initiative of the United States, pro-
duced a draft convention which merely permitted states to establish
zones near their coasts within which the discharge of oil would be
barred.' Nothing came of these proposals at that time, but they did
establish a framework for future measures against oil pollution. Thus,
when a convention was finally concluded in 1954-this time on British
initiative-it incorporated the zonal concept, 3 postponing to the future
a total prohibition of oil discharge anywhere on the oceans. What is
more, even in the zones established the convention did not prohibit oil
discharge altogether, but merely reduced the amount of permissible dis-
charge and provided for its control.'4 Enforcement was left in the hands
of the state of registry.' 5 To this end, states were required to provide
equally severe penalties for unlawful oil discharge outside their own
territorial waters as within them.'" States other than the state of registry
could inspect a ship's oil record books only when it was in their ports and,
if irregularities were found, they could or should notify the state of
registry for a proceeding according to the convention.' 7
In 1962 a subsequent amendment to the convention still refused to
face the problem in its totality and merely made the prohibitions on oil
discharge somewhat more stringent.'8 The system of prohibited zones was
extended outward to 100 miles in most areas (150 miles in the case of
Australia). In addition, new ships, i.e., ships of more than 20,000 tons be-
gun after the effective date of the revision, were forbidden to discharge
even outside the prohibited zones, except in special circumstances.' 0 Not
11. See Shepheard & Mann, Reducing the Menace of Oil Pollution, 31 D.p't State Bull.
311 (1954). See also 4 M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law 690 (196S).
12. Final Act of the Preliminary Conference on Oil Pollution of Navigable Waters, Annex,
art. I, [1966] 1 Foreign Rel. U.S. 238, 245 (1941). See also M. Mouton, The Continental
Shelf 162 (1952); Mann, The Problem of Sea Water Pollution, 29 Dep't State Bull. 775,
777 (1953); Sweeney, Oil Pollution of the Oceans, 37 Fordham L. Rev. 15S, 188 (196S).
13. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, done May
12, 1954, art. III, [1961] 3 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter cited
as 1954 Convention].
14. Id.
15. Id., art. X
16. Id., art. VI.
17. Id., art. IX.
18. International Convention for the Prevention of the Pollution of the Sea by Oil,
adopted April 11, 1962, [1966] 2 U.S.T. 1523, T.I.A.S. No. 6109, 600 U.N.T.S. 332 [here-
inafter cited as 1954 Convention Amended].
19. Id., art. fiI, annex A.
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until 1969, with a further amendment to the convention voted by the
assembly of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization
(IMCO), were measures against oil pollution brought almost-but not
quite-to the goal set initially by the United States in the early 1920's.O
The new amendment dispensed with zones and, instead, limited the
rate of discharge of oil or oily mixture for ships other than tankers
anywhere to no more than 60 liters per mile and to an oil content of
less than 100 parts per one million parts of the mixture.21 The discharge
was required to be made as far as practicable from land. The somewhat
more stringent requirements for tankers limited the total quantity of oil
discharged on a ballast voyage to one-fifteen-thousandth of the total car-
go-carrying capacity, and required the tanker to be more than 50 miles
from the nearest land. 2 Tankers under 500 gross tons, however, were
still left totally exempt.23
The 1954 Convention, by concentrating on only one form of pollution,
seems to have established a pattern for dealing with this problem which
was followed by the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas.24 This
convention also did not deal with pollution generally, but instead affirmed
a duty to control particular types of pollution which, according to the
law of the sea, states already had for all pollution. Thus it established a
duty for all states to draw up regulations to prevent pollution of the
seas by the discharge of oil from ships or pipelines.23 In drawing these
regulations, states were to take into account the existing treaties on the
subject. 6 A state whose provisions fell below the requirements of the
1954 Convention would now be violating international law if it were a
party to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas even if it were
not a party to the 1954 Convention as amended. But, since article 24
of the 1958 Convention does not set any standards and there are no ap-
plicable standards of international customary law, it would be difficult to
ascertain, short of their complete absence, whether or not a state's reg-
ulations concerning oil pipelines were adequate, and, therefore, whether
or not that state was discharging its obligations. It would seem that any
reasonable regulations would meet the requirements.
Another type of pollution which states are required to prevent by the
20. For the text of the completely amended convention, see 9 Int'l Legal Materials
1 (1970).
21. Id., art. III(a), at 3.
22. Id., art. III(b), at 4.
23. 1954 Convention, art. II.
24. See note 5 supra.




enactment of appropriate measures is that arising from the dumping of
radioactive waste.2 7 Dumping itself is not generally prohibited by inter-
national law until it unreasonably affects other uses and, because of
the long practice of states, may even be considered an accepted use
itself.28 Since there are no generally accepted standards, nor are any
provided by the 1958 Geneva Convention, and since the point at which
radioactive pollution becomes unreasonable cannot be established easily
without them, the dumping of nuclear waste into the oceans has been
indulged in by such nuclear powers as the United States and Great
Britain. In England, for example, radioactive liquids from the Windscale
Works in Cumberland have been discharged into the sea through a pipe-
line extending about three kilometers beyond the high water mark. -2 1 In
the United States dumping persists, but on a greatly reduced scale.3"
The perils of nuclear pollution and the need for comprehensive regu-
lation leading to speedy total elimination are underscored by the 1962
Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, which imposes
strict liability with a moderately high ceiling.31 However, this merely
focuses on mitigation after the fact. A step toward curbing the pollution
itself was made in 1963 when the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was con-
cluded, but since not all the countries possessing nuclear capacity are
parties to the treaty, the potentiality for harm remains 2
While the 1958 Geneva Convention attempts to regulate the dump-
ing of radioactive wastes, it altogether omits dumping of other toxic
materials which, in the aggregate, may have equally, if not more devas-
tatingly, harmful effects. In most industrialized countries, where streams
have long since lost their capacity to absorb wastes, heavy concen-
27. Id., art. 25.
28. Council on Environmental Quality, Ocean Dumping, A National Policy 35 (1970).
"The right to dispose of waste materials in the high seas is a traditional freedom of the
seas. However, under the standards set out in the Geneva Convention on the High Seas,
this freedom-like all other freedoms of the seas-must be exercised with reasonable regard
to other states' use of the oceans." Id.
29. See 4 Al. Whiteman, supra note 11, at 611-12.
30. According to the Council on Environmental Quality, the number of radioactive
containers disposed of at sea within the past decade has fallen from 6,120 in 1962 to zero
in 1968, 26 in 1969, and 2 in 1970. Council on Environmental Quality, supra note 4, at
7, table 10.
31. Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, reprinted in 57 Am. J.
Int'l L. 268 (1963). The convention imposes a ceiling on liability of 1500 million Poincar6
francs. Id., art. MI1(1), at 270.
32. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, done August 5, 1963, [19632 2 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S.
43. Of the nuclear powers, France and the People's Republic of China are not parties to this
treaty. See U.S. Dep't of State, Pub. No. 8567, Treaties in Force, at 333 (1971).
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trations of pollutants are released into the bordering seas. The cumula-
tive impact on plant and animal life is magnified by the food chain
with such marked effect as to visibly bring home the finiteness of the
oceans. 33 Furthermore, the ocean has become a favorite repository of
wastes from the land via direct dumping. 4 Neglect of the problem of
ocean dumping in existing conventions is to be remedied in the near fu-
ture. In preparation for the Conference on the Law of the Sea to be con-
vened by the United Nations in 1973,11 the United States has submitted
a draft convention on the regulation of ocean dumping which would im-
pose on states a duty to regulate dumping by permit3 and would limit
a state's discretion to issue permits when unreasonable pollution would
33. A considerable amount of literature is accumulating on this subject. See, e.g., O'Sul-
livan, Pollution by Industrial Waste and Sewage: Scientific Aspects and some Problems of
Control in the Marine Environment, in The David Dawes Memorial Institute of Int'l
Studies, Water Pollution as a World Problem 143-51 (1971); Man's Impact on the Global
Environment, Report of the Study of Critical Environmental Problems (SCEP) 131 (1970)
(Transport of DDT Residues to the Marine Environment); id. at 146 (Estuaries and
Coastal Ocean Areas); id. at 152 (Sampling the Marine Environment). Ironically, some
of the pollutants which find their way into the sea from the land may be returned from
the sea to the air and thence back to the land in rainwater-a complex example of global
pollution dynamics. See Lundholm, Interactions Between Oceans and Terrestrial Ecosystems,
in Symposium-Global Effects of Environmental Pollution 195 (S. Singer ed. 1970).
34. For example, in one year alone (1968) more than 48 million tons of various types
of wastes were dumped into the waters around the United States-23.8 million into the
Atlantic; 15.9 million into the Gulf of Mexico; and 8.3 million into the Pacific. Dredge
spoils make up about 80 percent of the total by weight, and of those which are dumped
into Atlantic waters, 45 percent are estimated to be polluted. For the Gulf and Pacific
coasts the percentages of polluted spoils are 31 and 19 respectively. Of the other types of
wastes disposed of at sea, industrial wastes account for 10 percent of the total, sewage
sludge for 9 percent, and construction debris, solid wastes and explosives for fractions of a
percent. See Council on Environmental Quality, supra note 4, at 3, tables 2 & 3. The dif-
ficulty of controlling this kind of pollution is shown by the recent statement of the ad-
ministrator of the United States Environmental Protection Agency: "Current regulatory
activities and authorities are not adequate to handle the problem of ocean dumping. States
have not exercised extensive regulatory authority. Furthermore, their authority extends only
within the three-mile territorial sea, and most ocean dumping occurs outside of these waters.
The Corps of Engineers has some regulatory authority over ocean dumping, but such
authority is subject to severe limitations. EPA has no authority under the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act to control ocean dumping. Furthermore, the general thrust of that
Act is the control of continuous discharges which violate water quality standards, rather
than control of intermittant dumping. The Coast Guard has enforcement capability but no
independent authority to control ocean dumping. The AEC's authority is limited to control-
ling the disposal of radioactive materials." 1 BNA Environment Rep. 1277, 1280 (1971).
35. GA. Res. 2750, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 26-27, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
36. United States: Draft Convention on the Regulation of Ocean Dumping, reprinted in
10 Int'l Legal Materials 1021 (1971).
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result.37 Each state is to establish its own criteria for permissible dump-
ing3 As an interim measure this is probably inevitable, but as a perma-
nent solution it is clearly inadequate. The task should eventually be
transferred to an international organization or agency.
The only other type of pollution with which the 1958 Geneva Con-
vention on the High Seas deals in the same general way as oil pollution
is that arising from exploitation of the seabed.39 This is a fairly recent
source of pollution, but one with an almost unlimited potential for harm.
The era of seabed exploitation was ushered in some three decades ago, as
technology evolved to extract the oil which was being discovered beneath
shallow coastal waters.40 Recognizing the opportunities presented by this
development, the United States, in the Truman Proclamation of 1945,
introduced a claim of dubious theoretical value, but of undoubted practi-
cal merit, to an exclusive right of coastal states to exploit the continental
shelf, i.e., the seabed of indefinite and varying extent adjacent to coastal
states.4 ' Since the Truman Proclamation opened to the states a new
frontier for expansion, it was accepted without protest, with all doubts
or objections which might stem from the venerable principle of freedom
of the seas being brushed aside. The exclusive claim to exploitation of
the continental shelf by the coastal states was put into practice with such
alacrity and enthusiasm that it probably became part of customary inter-
national law4 2 even before it was sanctioned by the 1958 Convention on
the Continental Shelf.43
37. Id., art. 111(b).
38. Id., art. 11(c).
39. Convention on the High Seas, art. 24. "Every State shall draw up regulations to
prevent pollution of the seas . . . resulting from the exploitation and exploration of the
seabed and its subsoil . . . ." Id.
40. One author has mentioned 1937 as the date of the commencement of drilling in open
waters in the Gulf of Mexico. I. Alcorn, The Pure Oil Company's Tideland Development
115 (1949). But the National Petroleum Council has stated that "[m]ethods for drilling
and producing in offshore waters of the United States have been developed entirely since
1946." Natl Petroleum Council, Petroleum Resources Under the Ocean Floor 17 (1969).
41. Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, Policy of the United States with Respect to the
Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1947),
59 Stat. 884 (1945).
42. This was the view, for example, of Lauterpacht. Lauterpacht, Sovereignty Over
Submarine Areas, 27 Y.B. Brit. Int'l L. 376, 376-77 (1950). But Kunz thought that at that
point customary international law was only in its formative stage. Kunz, Continental Shelf
and International Law: Confusion and Abuse, S0 Am. J. Int'l L. 828, 829-30 (1956). There
is little doubt that it is now part of customary international law. See North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases, [1969] I.CJ. 3, 22.
43. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done April 29, 1958, [1964) 1 U.S.T. 471,




The legal regime instituted by the Truman Proclamation and the
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf has provided the needed
stability for exploitation of oil from beneath coastal waters, a source
from which it is estimated one-third of the future world production will
be derived.44 With growing production, of course, both actual cases of
pollution and the threat of future pollution have increased. The like-
lihood of blowouts in even fairly well regulated production is illustrated
by the United States' experience in the Santa Barbara Channel. The
coastal state is charged with the duty to promulgate regulations to pre-
vent pollution resulting from these activities, but the convention contains
no guidelines or standards. Again, the old standby of reasonableness
applies, with all its uncertainty and ineffectiveness. 4
Neither customary international law nor the Geneva Convention of
1958 on the Continental Shelf set definite limits to the seabed under
coastal states' jurisdiction. Article 1 of the Continental Shelf Convention
states that
[f]or the purpose of these articles, the term "continental shelf" is used as referring
(a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside
the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to
where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural
resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas
adjacent to the coasts of islands.48
This definition lends itself to the interpretation that national jurisdiction
can be extended out over the seabed to the point or line at which it would
meet the jurisdiction of another coastal state. In shallow seas like the
North Sea, for example, this has already happened, but there the
depth of the water only rarely exceeds 200 meters.47 However, insofar
44. Commn on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources, Our Nation and the Sea: A
Plan for National Action 122 (1969).
45. Convention on the High Seas, art. 24.
46. Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. 1.
47. See Young, Offshore Claims and Problems in the North Sea, 59 Am. J. Int'l L. 505,
505-06 (1965), and sources cited therein. The way in which the North Sea has already been
subdivided by extensions or claims to extensions of national jurisdiction is demonstrated by
the boundaries shown on the maps introduced in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases.
See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [19691 I.C.J. 3, 15-17. Some of these boundaries
have been fixed in bilateral agreements concluded between the bordering states. E.g., Agree-
ment Between the United Kingdom and Denmark Relating to the Delimitation of the
Continental Shelf, March 8, 1966, [1967] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 85 (Cmd. 3278); Agreement
Between the United Kingdom and the Netherlands Relating to the Delimitation of the
Continental Shelf under the North Sea, Oct. 6, 1965, [1966] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 23 (Cmd.
3253), 595 U.N.T.S. 113; Agreement Between the United Kingdom and Norway Relating
to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, March 10, 1965, [19651 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 71
(Cmd. 2757), 551 U.N.T.S. 213.
[Vol. 40
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as the larger and deeper ocean bodies are concerned, the prevailing view,
at least for the time being, is that the exploitability test does not permit
of indefinite extension of jurisdiction by the coastal state. Nevertheless,
there is as yet no agreement as to where this jurisdiction should end.'
Control and prevention of pollution arising from seabed exploitation
both within and outside national jurisdiction will be a major feature of
the future regime of the seabed. Already a fair amount of progress has
been made in the United Nations, which has established a special com-
mittee for that purpose. Of the proposals submitted to that committee,4
the United States' draft of August 3, 1970, is the most comprehensive."'
In this draft the United States proposes that national jurisdiction be
limited to the areas landward of the 200-meter isobathY' Beyond national
jurisdiction there would be a zone of international trusteeship, extending
roughly from the 200-meter isobath to the limits of the continental slope -2
Within this zone, although it is part of the international seabed area,
jurisdiction over exploitation of the natural resources would belong to
the coastal states.5 3
48. The view that there is a limit to the coastal state's jurisdiction is inherent in the
title of the U.N. Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the
Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. See Comm. on the Peaceful Uses
of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, Report,
24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 22, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/7622 (1961). See also Comm. on the Peaceful
Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction,
Report, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 21, at 3, 25, U.N. Doc. A/8021 (1970). It is also recognized
in the U.S. proposals for the seabed. See United States Draft of U.N. Convention on the
International Seabed Area, reprinted in 9 Int'l Legal Materials 1046 (1970).
49. See Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the
Limits of National Jurisdiction, Report, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp 22, at 7-11, U.N. Doc. A/7622
(1961).
50. United States Draft of U.N. Convention on the International Seabed Area, supra
note 48.
51. Id., art. 1(2).
52. Id., art. 26(l).
53. Id., art. 27. This article states in part: "[Ejach coastal State, subject to the provisions
of this Convention, shall be responsible for:
a. Issuing, suspending and revoking mineral exploration and exploitation licenses;
b. Establishing work requirements ... ;
c. Ensuring that its licensees comply with this Convention, and, if it deems it necessary,
applying standards to its licensees higher than or in addition to those required under
this Convention, provided such standards are promptly communicated to the Inter-
national Seabed Resource Authority;
d. Supervising its licensees and their activities;
e. Exercising civil and criminal jurisdiction over its licensees, and persons acting on their
behalf, while engaged in exploration or exploitation;
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The proposed convention generally imposes on the parties the duty
to see that "[a]ll activities in the marine environment shall be con-
ducted with reasonable regard for exploration and exploitation of the
natural resources of the International Seabed Area." 4 It also requires
that such activities be conducted with adequate safeguards for the
protection of the marine environment.Y5 Furthermore, it makes each
contracting party responsible for damages, including damages caused
by all activities of its nationals or its licensees, both individuals and
corporations, to any other party or its nationals. 0 However, in contrast
to the United States' draft convention on dumping,"7 the proposed sea-
bed convention would entrust the power to make rules and regulations
for the protection of the marine environment against pollution to an
international agency, the International Seabed Resources Authority.
Moreover, this agency would have the power to issue emergency orders
at the request of any contracting party to prevent serious harm to the
marine environment arising out of any exploration or exploitation activ-
ity.59 Finally, the draft convention provides for adjudication of disputes
before a special tribunal, including disputes over pollution.00 The weak-
ness of this draft as far as pollution is concerned is that, perhaps of
necessity, it limits the rule-making power of the International Seabed
h. Determining the allowable catch of living resources of the seabed and prescribing
other conservation measures regarding them;
L Enacting such laws and regulations as are necessary to perform the above functions."
54. Id., art. 7.
55. Id., art. 9.
56. Id., art. 11.
57. United States: Draft Convention on the Regulation of Ocean Dumping, supra note
36.
58. United States Draft of U.N. Convention on International Seabed Area, supra note
48, art. 23.
59. Id., art. 40(j).
60. Id., arts. 46 & 50. Article 46(1) states: "The Tribunal shall decide all disputes and
advise on all questions relating to the interpretation and application of this Convention
which have been submitted to it in accordance with the provisions of this Convention. In
its decisions and advisory opinions the Tribunal shall also apply relevant principles of inter-
national law."
The Tribunal may impose on the contracting party or the licensee a fine of not more
than $1000 for each day of the offense, payable to the Authority, or damages to any other
party concerned, or both. Id., art. 52(2). The Tribunal also prescribes the revocation of
licenses. Id., art. 52(3). Any contracting party or any affected persons may appeal from the
decisions of the organs of the Authority to the Tribunal. Id., art. 54. The draft convention
specifies that "[in any case in which the Council issues an order in emergency circumstances
to prevent serious harm to the marine environment, any directly affected Contracting Party
may request immediate review by the Tribunal, which shall promptly either confirm or
suspend the application of the emergency order pending the decision of the case." Id., art. 59.
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Authority to the international area. Unfortunately, pollution knows no
artificial jurisdictional boundaries.
HI. RE PONSIBIITY FOR POLLUTION
International law generally imposes on users a duty not to pollute
the oceans. Since the oceans are used by private and state entities,
both are responsible when they are remiss in fulfilling this duty. The
1969 Brussels Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution from
Ships61 is a reaffirmation and elaboration of the general maritime law
which imposes liability for damages for oil pollution caused by a ship
on the persons responsible for the ship.12 Following the wreck of the
Torrey Canyon, for example-and this was well before the convention
was concluded-the British and French governments brought claims
in courts of the United States against Union Oil Company, a United
States' corporation which was the tanker's real owner, though ostensibly
a mere time charterer, and against Barracuda Tanker, a Liberian corpora-
tion, the registered owner."3 The convention channels the liability into
the shipowner,' establishes limited strict liability (210 million Poincar6
francs for one incident) ,6 and gives jurisdiction over the claims to the
courts of the states which sustain damage.00
61. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, reprinted in
9 Int'l Legal Materials 45 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Brussels Convention].
62. See Sweeney, Oil Pollution of the Oceans, 37 Fordham L. Rev. 155 (1968). "There-
fore, pollution damage upon navigable waters to vessels, maritime structures and shellfish
beds would give rise to the admiralty remedy, whereas shorefront owners would have been
remediless in admiralty because of the locality test. One significant consequence of this
test encompassing all navigable waters is that American and English admiralty courts are
not restrained from proceeding against offending vessels regardless of flag and regardless of
the fact that the offending vessel may not have been in territorial waters at the time of
the tort. Thus, if the restrictions of the locality test could be removed, the pollution climant
would find an effective remedy against any vessel causing pollution damage under the general
maritime law.' Id. at 165 (footnote omitted). See also Convention on the High Seas, art. 24:
"Every State shall draw up regulations to prevent pollution of the seas by the discharge of
oil from ships or pipelines or resulting from the exploitation and exploration of the seabed
and its subsoil . .. .2' On the way in which responsibility of individuals is generally estab-
lished in international law see 2 D. O'Connell, International Law 956 (2d ed. 1970). For
a principle on collision and salvage on the high seas see Restatement (Second) of Foreign
Relations § 35, at 98 (1965), which states:. "A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of
general maritime law, as understood by the state, to govern the substantive results of civil
claims for collision or salvage service on the high seas, when those claim are asserted for
adjudication or other determination in its territory against persons or vessels found there."
63. See In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F. Supp. 228, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), remanded,
409 F.2d 1013 (2d-Cir. 1969), noted in I J. Mfar. L. & Commerce 146, 148 (1969).
64. Brussels Convention, art. II.
65. Id., arts. M & IV.
66. Id., art. IM
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Apart from the convention, however, suit for pollution damages can
be brought in states other than those whose nationals sustained damage,
as in the Torrey Canyon case, where the British and French governments
pressed actions in several countries against the owners and charterers.0 7
Since the range of possibilities is so wide (courts of the owners' state,
of the flag state, of the state which sustained damage, or of the state in
whose port the offending ship may happen to be located), the decisive
factor in most cases will be sheer convenience. Again, as in any instance
in which injury is caused by a foreign state or foreign enterprise, suit
may be brought in municipal courts by the individuals injured, or by
the state representing them, or by the state on its own behalf, if its
proper interests were injured.6 The state may also bring an action on
an international level if its nationals have been denied justice in another
state, 9 or if its own interests have been directly injured by another
state.70 When these interests of the state include protection of the marine
environment, and the injury to that environment does not result in direct
damage to health and property (as, for example, when there is extensive
destruction of marine organisms caused by the dumping of wastes out-
side established fishing areas and outside navigation routes) the com-
plaining state might be considered as vindicating the rights of the
international community, but this is not as yet generally permitted in
international law.
In order to take such action the state must find a treaty or rule of
customary law giving it the right to act on behalf of the international
community. There was agreement on this point between the opinion of
the majority and the dissenting opinion of Judge Jessup in the South
West Africa Cases.7 The court stated:
Next, it may be said that a legal right or interest need not necessarily relate to
anything material or "tangible".. . . [F]or instance, States may be entitled to uphold
some general principle even though the particular contravention of it alleged has not
affected their own material interests . . . . The Court simply holds that such rights
or interests, in order to exist, must be clearly vested in those who claim them, by
some text or instrument, or rule of law .... 72
Similarly, Judge Jessup said:
I agree that there is no generally established actio populdaris in international law. But
international law has accepted and established situations in which States are given a
67. See In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F. Supp. 228, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), remanded,
409 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1969).
68. See generally C. Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in International Law (1928).
69. See generally Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case, [1924] P.C.Ij., ser. A, No. 2;
2 D. O'Connell, supra note 62, at 945-47.
70. See 2 D. O'Connell, supra note 62, at 952-56.
71. [1966] I.CJ. 4.
72. Id. at 32.
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right of action without any showing of individual prejudice or individual substantive
interest as distinguished from the general interest.73
It may be impossible to identify a specific rule that would authorize
actio popularis in the pollution field, but generally the conditions are
ripe for the emergence of the right of individual states to an unpolluted
marine environment. This is indicated by unilateral claims to the right
to protect that environment and by the inclusion of the marine environ-
ment as the protected interest in recent draft conventions7  But the
connection between the interests of the international community and
the interests of individual states is so close, and the interests are so
intertwined where pollution is concerned, that it may be incorrect to
talk of injury to the international community alone when substantial
damage is done to the marine environment. The pollution is then harm-
ful not only to the international community in the abstract, but also
to actual individuals and states. The intervening state protects primarily
its own interest in an ocean fit to be used by all-an ocean, therefore,
which must be used in a manner and to an extent that does not impair
such fitness. Only secondarily does the state protect the interests of
the international community.
While a state can bring a civil action against a foreign ship for
damages caused by pollution on the high seas, it is doubtful whether it
could validly subject such a ship to its penal laws while the ship is
located in its ports. Pollution does not as yet rank among those vital
interests for the protection of which international law, at its present
stage of development, gives states jurisdiction over the conduct of aliens
outside its territory.75 Accordingly, the 1954 Convention specifically
reserves punishment for oil pollution on the high seas to the flag state. 0
Moreover, polluting ships are immune from seizure and interference on
73. Id. at 387-88 (dissenting opinion).
74. For recent draft conventions see, e.g., United States: Draft Convention on the
Regulation of Ocean Dumping, art. 3(b), reprinted in 10 Int'l Legal Materials 1021 (1971) ;
United States Draft of U.N. Convention on International Seabed Area, supra note 48, art.
23, at 1052.
75. Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations § 33 (1965): "A state has jurisdiction to
prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct outside its territory that
threatens its security as a state or the operation of its governmental functions, provided the
conduct is generally recognized as a crime under the law of states that have reasonably
developed legal systems." Id. § 33, at 92. The French Revised Code of Criminal Procedure
states: "'Any foreigner who, outside the territory of France, shall be culpable, either as
principal or as an accomplice, of a crime against the security of the state . . . shall be
prosecuted and tried according to the provisions of French laws, if he is arrested in France
or if the Government obtains his extradition."' W. Bishop, International Law, Ca.es and
Materials 560 (3d ed. 1971), translating C. Pro. Pbi. art. 694 (Se ed. Petits Codes Dalloz
1966-67).
76. 1954 Convention, art. 11(a).
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the high seas by any state other than the flag state. Neither customary
international law nor the 1958- Convention on the High Seas includes
pollution among those acts which make boarding a foreign ship on the
high seas permissible.77
In addition to whatever responsibility the individual may have, states
bear responsibility for pollution, whether caused by their instrumentalities
or by private entities under their jurisdiction. However, the scope of
the responsibility in these instances differs. When pollution is caused
by a state's instrumentalities, the criteria for imputing acts of govern-
mental agencies to the state are applicable. Acts of officials, whether
within or without the scope of their competence, are state acts when a
state's power is used to perform them.7" Thus the Grotian idea70 that
there must be fault on the part of the state as distinguished from its
organs has been generally discarded. 0 However, the notion that fault
on the part of the organs themselves is necessary before responsibility
can be imputed to the state is a widely held view.8" Recently, however,
it has been shown that there is a trend in the opinions of arbitral tri-
bunals, and especially in the jurisprudence of the World Court, in favor
of an objective theory of responsibility which dispenses with the notion
of fault.8 2 If this trend persists it will eventually eliminate any lingering
77. Convention on the High Seas, art. 22.
78. Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations § 169 (1965) provides: "Conduct of any
organ or other agency of a state, or of any official, employee, or other individual agent of
the state or of such agency, that causes injury to an alien, is attributable to the state . . . if
it is within the actual or apparent authority, or within the scope of the functions, of such
agency or individual agent."
79. 2 H. Grotius, The Law of War and Peace ch. XVII, § XX(2), at 437 (F. Kelsey
transl. 1964). "The liability of one for the acts of his servants without fault of his own does
not belong to the law of nations . . . ." Id.
80. See C. Eagleton, supra note 68, at 209-14.
81. See, e.g., 33 Ann. Inst. dr. i. (1) 471 (1927). "L'Etat n'est responsable que si l'inexdcu-
tion de l'obligation internationale est la consequence du dol ou do la n6gligence do ses organes."
Id. (italics omitted). See also H. Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of Inter-
national Law 141-43 (1927).
82. See 2 P. Guggenheim, Traitd de Droit international public 53 (1954). In analyzing
the Wimbledon Case ([1923J P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 1) Guggenheim stated: "Elle [)a cour]
s'en abstint pourtant et fit d~pendre la sanction uniquement de ]a violation objective do
l'art. 380 du trait6 de paix de Versailles. Par ]a suite, ]a Cour s'en tint toujours A cette
jurisprudence." Id. (footnotes omitted), See also 1 G. Schwarzenberger, International Law
632 (3d ed. 1957). "Until the Judgment in the Corfu Channel (Merits) case (1949), the
practice of the World Court had been unambiguous. It was based on the assumption that
any imputable and voluntary breach of an international obligation constituted an inter-
national tort. Not in a single judgment or advisory opinion did the Court pay any attention
to guilty intent or negligence as a constituent element of international torts." Id. (footnote
omitted) (italics omitted). Similarly, Professor Hardy states: "Tho situation as regards
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reliance in pollution cases on proof of fault on the part of state organs,
except when the particular applicable norm would proclaim otherwise.
Thus, for example, if the 1969 Brussels Liability Convention (which
happens to impose strict liability on the owners of merchant vessels-
including states-for oil spilled)83 required fault for this liability, the
rules of that convention would be controlling."
When it comes to pollution originating within a state, but caused by
persons other than state organs, the Corfu Channel CaseS--in which
the International Court of Justice predicated Albania's responsibility
on knowledge of the minefields within her territorial sea and devoted
considerable effort to ascertaining the existence of this knowledge 8o-
indicates that responsibility based on fault still fully obtains.' Since
unmistakable 'State acts' is somewhat different from that as regards the acts of private
citizens, even grouped into armed bands, and here it seems that in many cases the require-
ment of 'fault' is of doubtful application, even at international law. Thus it has never been
suggested, in the event of a breach of a treaty obligation for example, that a wilful or
negligent breach must be shown before an international wrong was committed. Nor similarly
is proof of any form of carelessness or malicious behaviour necessary, if it is sought to hold
a State responsible for the acts of what are unquestionably State organs. Thus in the case
of The Wanderer, where a British sealing ship was seized by an American vessel, it was said
by the Arbitral Tribunal:
The bona fides of the United States naval officers is not questioned. It is evident that
the provisions of section 10 of the Act of Conzress constituted a likely c-tse of error.
But the United States Government is responsible for that section, and liable for the
errors of judgment committed by its agents."
Hardy, International Protection Against Nuclear Risks, 10 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 739, 756-57
(1961) (footnotes omitted) (italics omitted).
83. Brussels Convention, art. III. Although this convention excludes public ships from
its scope, it does indicate the trend in the whole field of pollution of the oceans. Id, arL
XI(1).
84. This is also the view of Amerasinghe. C. Amerasinghe, State Responsibility for In-
juries to Aliens 45 (1967).
85. [1949] I.C.J. 4.
86. Id. at 18-23.
87. For a similar evaluation of the Corfu Channel Case see 1 L. Oppenheim, International
Law 343 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955); Hardy, supra note 82, at 753. However, it has
also been held that since the Corfu Channel opinion nowhere mentions fault, it can be
interpreted as supporting strict responsibility. See E. Jimnez de Arfchaga, Manual of Public
International Law 537-38 (M. Sorensen ed. 1968). See also Goldie, International Principles
of Responsibility for Pollution, 9 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 283, 306-07 (1970). Professor
Schwarzenberger makes a distinction between the requirements of knowledge and fault:
"The actual knowlddge postulated by the Court and fault in the meanings of dolus or
culpa are not the same thing. If these notions were identical, a reasonable mistake on the
part of the Albanian authorities that the third party which had laid the mines had notified,
or would notify, international shipping might have absolved Albania.... On the pleadings,
it was not necessary for the Court to express itself on this contingency. Until, however,
the Court has found on the issue of the relevance of bona fide factual mistake, it remains
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the Corfu Channel Case did not deal with pollution, it may be con-
sidered as not affecting the earlier holding in the Trail Smelter Case
(United States v. Canada),"" which has been widely acknowledged as
having established strict liability for pollution."0 In Trail Smelter the
Arbitral Tribunal stated:
[N]o State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as
to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another .... 90
The words "permit the use" in this statement may be understood as
not requiring actual knowledge on the part of the state. But, on the
other hand, they may equally well be understood as predicating state
responsibility on such knowledge-and thus as not differing in this
respect from the Corfu Channel opinion.
It may well be that we are, as we should be, on the threshold of an
emerging objective responsibility of the state for any pollution which
emanates from its territory, including that caused by private enterprises.'
The concurring opinion of Judge Alvarez in the Corfu Channel Case goes
further in that direction than the opinion of the court by postulating
the territorial sovereign's knowledge of injurious occurrences and shift-
ing the burden of disclaiming such knowledge to the sovereign. Judge
Alvarez stated:
As a consequence of the foregoing [sovereignty], every State is considered as
having known, or as having a duty to have known, of prejudicial acts committed in
parts of its territory where local authorities are installed; that is not a presumption,
nor is it a hypothesis, it is the consequence of its sovereignty. If the State alleges
that it was unaware of these acts, particularly if they occurred in circumstances in
which vigilance was unavailing-e.g., by the action of submarines, etc.-it must
prove that this was the case, for otherwise its responsibility is involved.02
Nevertheless, this falls short of strict responsibility, since the state can
still refute or rebut the imputation of knowledge.
Similar in type and scope is the responsibility of the state for pollu-
tion caused by private ships and enterprises under its jurisdiction on the
doubtful whether, even in relation to unlawful omissions, the Court has adopted the culpa-
doctrine." 1 G. Schwarzenberger, supra note 82, at 633 (italics omitted). However, he
himself admits that "the difference between both concepts is highly relative. Actual knowl-
edge which is inferred changes imperceptibly into constructive knowledge, and the border-
line between the latter and negligence is even more fluid." Id.
88. 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905 (1938).
89. See, e.g., Goldie, supra note 87, at 306-07; Hardy, supra note 82, at 751-52.
90. 3 U.N.R.I.AA. at 1965.
91. Goldie, supra note 87, at 306-17, has assembled examples of strict or absolute
liability for pollution emanating from land, for pollution caused by nuclear ships, and for
oil pollution.
92. Corfu Channel Case, [19491 I.C.J. 4, 44 (concurring opinion).
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high seas. If the state fails in its duty, imposed by customary international
law, to prevent unreasonable pollution, it becomes responsible for the
damage. This responsibility has been affirmed by the 1958 Geneva Con-
vention on the High Seas, which recognizes that there must be a degree
of control by a state over ships flying its flag 5 and charges states with
drawing up regulations for the prevention of the main types of ocean
pollution.' It may be that this responsibility, based on fault, is being
replaced by an emerging broader principle that states should be generally
responsible for any activities of entities under their jurisdiction in areas
outside the territorial jurisdiction of any state. Under this rule, the activ-
ities of entities other than state organs would be strictly imputed to the
state as soon as they were found to transgress a pertinent rule of law,
but the finding of transgression may or may not depend on fault. A state
would simply become responsible for private enterprises in the same way
as it is already responsible for the activities of its organs. Thus the
1967 Space Treaty states in article 6: "Parties to the Treaty shall bear
international responsibility for national activities in outer space .... ,,95
Similarly, the United States draft of the United Nations Convention on
International Sea Bed Area states:
Each Contracting Party shall be responsible for damages caused by activities which
it authorizes or sponsors to any other Contracting Party or its nationals.08
The evidence is still scanty and barely enough to indicate a trend, but
the need for such a rule is obvious, and whenever circumstances are ripe
it is only a question of time before the appropriate rule emerges.
93. Convention on the High Seas, art. S.
94. Id., arts. 24 & 25.
95. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, done Jan. 27, 1967,
art. 6, [1967] 3 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347. Goldie thinks that the space treaty
establishes responsibility based on fault: "In contrast to the level of responsibility called for
in the nuclear energy treates [sic], the 1963 Draft Declaration and the Outer Space Treaty im-
pose a concept similar to fault liability, permitting an operator who deliberately creates
a risk to pass at least some of the cost of that risk onto others, thereby to expropriate
from them." Goldie, supra note 87, at 312. But it seems that articles 6 and 7 of the
treaty establish state responsibility only for operator activities; they do not determine
whether fault of the operator is necessary to create this responsibility. This is to be done
by another convention, which has just been concluded and contains a mishmash of strict
and fault liability. See U.N. Draft Convention on Liability for Damage Caused by Objects
Launched into Outer Space, arts. 2, 3, 4(1)(a) & (b), reprinted in 10 Int'l Legal Materials
965 (1971).
96. United States Draft of U.N. Convention on the International Seabed Area, supra
note 48, art. 11(4).
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IV. SCOPE OF JURISDICTION OF COASTAL STATES
A. Jurisdiction Within Twelve Miles of the Coast
By general principles of law, by customary international law, and by
conventions, states are accorded more powers to control pollution in
stretches of water adjacent to their shores than in any other part of
the sea. This, of course, reflects the recognition by international law
of the special interests of coastal states. The fullest power or jurisdiction
of the coastal state is in the territorial sea97 and is generally limited only
by the right of innocent passage of foreign vessels. 8 The limitations
imposed by this right do not, however, preclude states from enacting and
enforcing anti-pollution laws and regulations applicable to foreign ships
within the territorial sea.
The 1958 Geneva Convention, which generally embodies customary
international law, states in article 17:
Foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage shall comply with the laws
and regulations enacted by the coastal State in conformity with these articles and
other rules of international law and, in particular, with such laws and regulations
relating to transport and navigation. 9
The expressions "transport" and "navigation" are broad enough to in-
clude rules concerning pollution. However, if there were any doubt as
to whether article 17 provided an adequate basis for the state's anti-
pollution regulations, the right to enact these regulations is implied in
article 16, which says: "The coastal State may take the necessary
steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent." 100
97. There was some controversy on this point, in which the theory was advanced that
the territorial sea is no more than a kind of contiguous zone where states have specific
separate rights or servitudes. See generally P. Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters and
Maritime Jurisdiction 115-19 (1927). More recently it has become generally accepted that
states have sovereignty or full jurisdiction over the territorial sea. See J. Andrssy, Inter-
national Law and the Resources of the Sea 45-46 (1970). The dominant theory has been
enshrined in article 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Con-
tiguous Zone, which states: "1. The sovereignty of a State extends, beyond its land territory
and its internal waters, to a belt of sea adjacent to its coast, described as the territorial
sea. 2. This sovereignty is exercised subject to the provisions of these articles and to other
rules of international law." Convention On the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done
April 29, 1958, art. 1, [19641 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter
cited as 1958 Territorial Sea Convention].
98. This right is so well established in international law that, according to Professor
Jessup, it does not even require citation of authority to prove it. P. Jessup, supra note 97,
at 120. It was recognized even for warships in the holding in the Corfu Channel Case,
[1949] I.C.J. 4, and finally was embodied and given precision in the 1958 Convention on
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(1).
99. 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, art. 17.
100. Id., art. 16(1).
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The expression "take ... steps" seems, again, broad enough to include
anti-pollution rules. The only condition would be that these rules must
apply to the prevention of non-innocent passage, which was defined in
article 14 as passage prejudicial "to the peace, good order or security
of the coastal State."' 10
In view of the size of modem ships, especially tankers, non-compliance
with such measures for the prevention and mitigation of pollution as,
inter alia, observance of special routes, special safety devices, or pilotage
conditions, would be considered as posing a threat to the coastal state
and thus would make passage not innocent. Prior to the 1958 Conference
on the Law of the Sea, the International Law Commission had in fact
stated, in its sixth session draft on the Regime of the Territorial Sea,
that
[p]assage is not innocent if a vessel makes use of the territorial sea of a coastal
State for the purpose of committing any act prejudicial to the security or public
policy of that State or to such other of its interests as the territorial sea is intended
to protect.10 2
In the comment to this article the Commission had expressly identified
"such other interests" as including the ones enumerated in article 21 of
its draft. 03 Second among these latter interests was "protection of the
waters of the coastal State against pollution of any kind caused by
vessels . ... ."" Nevertheless, in its final draft, which became the basis
of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,
the Commission abandoned specific enumeration because of the length-
ening roster of interests to be protected.' 0 5
Ships that do not comply with the coastal state's anti-pollution pro-
visions can be denied access to its territorial waters or ports. 00 This
right, which is implied in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone--that the coastal state may take the necessary
101. Id., art. 14(4).
102. Report on the Regime of the Territorial Sea, art. 17, [1954] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n
140, 158, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954) (emphasis added).
103. Id.
104. Id., art 21(b), at 159.
105. See Report on the Law of the Sea, supra note 6, art. 18, at 258. In this report the
commission relegated the enumeration of specific interests to a comment Id. at 274.
106. There is still some controversy as to whether a state can at will prevent access to
its ports for particular foreign ships. The better view and practice seems to be that it can.
See McDougal & Burke 107. Even the proponents of the freedom of ports admit, as a rule,
the right to exclude for security reasons. See 1 P. Fauchille, Trait6 de Droit International
Public (H) 1021 (8th ed. 1925); 1 C. Hyde, International Law 582 (2d rev. ed. 1947).
See generally L. Hydeman & W. Berman, International Control of Nuclear Maritime Activ-
ities 131-42 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Hydeman & Berman].
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steps to prevent non-innocent passage' 07-is fully supported by the Dec-
laration on Maritime Pollution adopted after extensive debate by the
Institute of International Law at its Edinburgh session in 1969. Article
6 of its Resolution III (Measures Concerning Accidental Pollutions of
the Seas) states:
States have the right to prohibit any ship that does not conform to the standards
set up in accordance with the preceding articles for the design and equipment of the
ships, for the navigation instruments, and for the qualifications of the officers and
members of the crews, from crossing their territorial seas and contiguous zones and
from reaching their ports.108
The coastal state can also proceed both civilly and criminally against
the offending ship. The 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone permits a state to levy execution against or seize a ship
for the purpose of any civil proceedings in respect to obligations or
liabilities incurred in the course of or for the purposes of the voyage.100
This obviously includes liability for pollution committed in passage
through territorial waters. The convention also permits the coastal state
to arrest any person or to conduct an investigation in connection with
any crime committed on board a ship during such passage if the con-
sequences of the crime extend to the coastal state.110 This, again, would
appear to include pollution.
The question of the breadth of the territorial sea is still unsettled,
but it may be safely stated that since the Geneva Conventions on the
Law of the Sea, international law on this subject has evolved to allow
any state to extend its territorial sea twelve miles seaward, thus vin-
dicating the International Law Commission's hesitant acknowledgement
of this trend in its final report of 1956.111 A number of states already
claimed twelve miles at the time of the first Geneva Convention.1
1 2
Since then many more have made such claims," 8 one of the most recent
being Canada, which abandoned the losing side in June, 1970. Ob-
jections, whenever made, have amounted to no more than ineffective
107. 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16.
108. Measures Concerning Accidental Pollutions of the Seas, art. VI, reprinted In 53
Ann. Inst. dr. i. (II) 380, 382 (1969).
109. 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, art. 20(2).
110. Id., art. 19(1)(a).
111. Report on the Law of the Sea 256.
112. See 4 M. Whiteman, supra note 11, at 17, table at 21-23.
113. Id. at 34-35. See also Oda, International Law of the Resources of the Sea, 127
Recueil des Cours 355, 382 (1969 II).
114. See Can. Rev. Stat. c. 45 (1st Supp. 1970). For a history of the act Involved, see
Gold, Pollution of the Sea and International Law: A Canadian Perspective, 3 J. Mar. L.
& Commerce 13, 35-36 (1971).
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"paper protests."1 5 Even the United States, without officially abandoning
the three-mile zone, has recently expressed readiness to acknowledge
the legitimacy of the twelve-mile territorial sea."" In view of this, the
fights of the coastal state in the so-called contiguous zone established
by the 1958 Geneva Convention seem to be of a transitory character,
since this zone cannot be extended farther than twelve miles from the
shore and it can seemingly be incorporated into the territorial sea at
any time.
However, even without extending the territorial sea, the provisions
of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
impliedly give the coastal state jurisdiction over pollution up to twelve
miles. Although article 24 of the convention does not mention pollution,
it allows the coastal state to exercise jurisdiction in sanitary matters. 1 '
This jurisdiction is generally considered broad enough to include pollu-
tion."' The coastal state is specifically empowered to exercise the
control necessary to "[p]revent infringement of its customs, fiscal, im-
migration or sanitary regulations within its territory or territorial sea
... [and to] [p]unish infringement of the above regulations committed
within its territory or territorial sea."'1 Prevention is understood gen-
erally as encompassing the adoption of regulations and the exercise of
surveillance and exclusion, but not arrest or punishment. The latter are
reserved as actions to be utilized subsequent to a violation within a
state's territory or territorial sea. This means, of course, that the
coastal state can arrest and punish outgoing ships but not incoming or
passing ships." Similarly, the Institute of International Law's Edin-
115. See 4 M. Whiteman, supra note 11, at 118-19.
116. U.S. Draft Articles on the Territorial Sea, Straits, and Fisheries Submitted to
U.N. Seabeds Committee, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SC. II/L. 4, reprinted in 65 Dep't
State Bull. 261, 266 (1971).
117. 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, art. 24.
118. This is evidenced by the comment of the Int'l Law Comm'n to its final draft,
which was the basis for the convention. Report on the Law of the Sea 294-95; see Hydeman
& Berman 240-47.
119. 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, art. 24.
120. See Fitzmaurice, Some Results of the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea,
8 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 73, 114-15 (1959). This is also the interpretation given to the con-
vention by Arthur Dean, chief United States delegate at the 1958 Conference. Dean, The
Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: What Was Accomplished, 52 Am. J. Int'l L.
607, 624 (1958). See also Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations § 21 (1965), which
states:
"(1) A state has jurisdiction to prescribe and to enforce, with respect to conduct occurring
in a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, rules of law necessary to
(a) prevent the infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary regulations
within its territory, including its territorial sea;
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burgh declaration of 1969, which is the most recent authoritative pro-
nouncement on states' duties and rights concerning pollution of the sea,
implicitly permits the coastal state to lay down rules and regulations
for ships passing through the contiguous zone and to enforce them
through exclusion and denial of access. 21
B. Jurisdiction Beyond Twelve Miles From Shore
Despite the actual or potential absorption of the contiguous zone into
the territorial sea and the probability that the zone will soon be elimi-
nated altogether, parties to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Terri-
torial Sea and the Contiguous Zone are prevented from claiming larger
areas of protection, at least for the interests embraced by the contiguous
zone, among which is pollution. 12 2 The twelve-mile limit would also apply
to non-parties if a zone of that breadth for the protection of these
interests had become a rule of customary international law before 1958,
or if it had since ripened into such a rule. This, however, was not the
case. 2 3 Non-parties can thus claim protection zones for these interests
beyond twelve miles if they can find a basis for such claims in general
principles of law or customary international law. It has been convincingly
argued that protection of some of these interests, such as customs and
immigration, at a reasonable distance from the shore could have ripened
into customary law before 1958124 through repeated practice and lack of
(b) punish the infringement of such regulations committed within its territory, including
its territorial sea."
For a criticism of this view see Oda, The Concept of the Contiguous Zone, 11 Int'l & Comp,
L.Q. 131, 153 (1962).
121. See Measures Concerning Accidental Pollutions of the Seas, arts. 1, 2, 4, & 6, re-
printed in 53 Ann. Inst. dr. i. (II) 380, 380-81 (1969).
122. Cf. Hydeman & Berman 244-45.
123. There is little evidence that states have observed the twelve-mile limitation in
claiming jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea. The English did not so limit themselves,
exercising such jurisdiction in customs matters out to 100 leagues (300 miles) throughout the
nineieenth century. See Hdeman & Beiman 188-90; McDougal & Burke 585. The United
States has exercised a similar jurisdiction. For example, the Anti-Smuggling Act of 1935
(19 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (1970)) permits arrest of foreign hovering ships at dstances of up
to 100 miles from shore. On the American practice in general, see Church v. Hubbart, 6
U:S. (2 Cranch) 187 (1804) (Marshall, CJ.). Both Hydeman & Berman and McDougal &
Burke conclude generally that article 24 of the convention cannot be considered a codifica-
tion of existing law. Hydeman & Berman 243-44; McDougal & Burke 606-07.
It is equally doubtful whether the twelve-mile distance has become a rule of customary
international law since the signing of the convention. The limited number of ratifications-
39 as of Jan. 1, 1971 (U.S. Dep't of State, Pub. 8567, Treaties in Force, at 325 (1971))-
and the general lack of uniformity in the seaward extent of jurisdictional claims which
states make for various purposes (see 4 M. Whiteman, supra note 11, at 21), convincingly
militate against such a view.
124. E.g., Hydeman & Berman 195-97; McDougal & Burke 602.
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protest. It is doubtful, however, whether protection against pollution
did so, simply because the practice did not have sufficient chance to
develop either specifically for pollution prevention or generally for sani-
tary purposes.32 But, unless the problem is satisfactorily solved by gen-
eral convention, the growing interest in pollution protection undoubtedly
will lead to the emergence of customary international law in this area.
Canada has already taken the lead in the making of this law.?0
Spurred by the discovery of oil deposits in the Arctic and by the opening
up of the Northwest Passage, it enacted in 1969 a statute which gives
it power to control pollution in Arctic waters roughly out to 100 miles
north of its coast, and to lay and enforce regulations for foreign ships."-
The Canadians have not claimed sovereignty over this area, but only
the right to prevent pollution."
Although the lack of general acquiescence in the claims made by
coastal states of a right to regulate foreign shipping in the interests of
pollution prevention in coastal waters deprives these claims of the status
of existing customary law,129 it does not deprive them of the status of
an emerging rule of law. Since there is a genuine need to minimize and
prevent pollution and since the special interests of the coastal state in
the waters off its shores but beyond its territorial sea are generally
recognized, the right of coastal states to maintain preventive regulation
of pollution in these waters is at a stage when exaggerated claims and
125. After reviewing the conclusions of writers on this subject, Hydeman & Berman
acknowledged the impossibility of concluding that "the limited practice of extending san-
itary control beyond the limits of territorial seas is sufficient, in and of itself, to provide
the basis for a rule of customary international law. Rather, such a conclusion must be
based on the acceptance of a customary rule of law in customs control and the close
analogy between customs and sanitary control. Because of limited practice, the International
Law Commission took a more conservative view of contiguous zones for sanitary purposes
than it did for customs zones. The Commission concluded that contiguous zones for san-
itary control should be recognized, but it did not suggest the existence of a rule of customary
international lawv." Hydeman & Berman 200 (footnote omitted). For the International Law
Commission's views see Report on the Law of the Sea 294-95.
126. See Goldie, supra note 87, at 304-06; Henkin, Arctic Anti-Pollution: Does Canada
Make-or Break-International Law?, 65 Am. J. Int'l L. 131 (1971).
127. An Act to Amend the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 45
(Ist Supp. 1971); see Morin, Le progris technique, la pollution et r'cvolution r -ente du
droit de la mer au Canada, particulirement i l'gard de l'Arctique, 8 Can. Y.B. Int'l L. 158
(1970). See also Gold, supra note 114.
128. See Canadian Prime Mitnister's Remarks on the Proposed Legislation, 9 Int'l Legal
Materials 600, 601-02 (1970).
129. Acquiescence was stressed by the International Court of Justice in upholding Nor-
way's claim to straight base lines in the Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway),
[1951] LCJ. 116, 138-39. On acquiescence and customary international law see generally
MacGibbon, Customary International Law and Acquiescence, [1957] Brit. Y.B. Int'l
L. 115 (1957).
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counterclaims are made preliminary to the emergence of a general rule.1' 0
The Canadian claim would rest on more solid ground if it could be
shown that international law permits coastal states to exercise jurisdiction
over foreign shipping for any reasonable purpose at any reasonable dis-
tance from the shore. Then it would not be necessary to show that the
assertion of a particular type of jurisdiction over the high seas had be-
come a rule of customary international law, but merely that such asser-
tion was reasonable in particular circumstances. This view, which has had
advocates in the past, has most recently been espoused by Hydeman
and Berman:
A rule of international law seems to have emerged which permits a coastal State to
make reasonable assertions of jurisdiction and control in areas of the high seas con-
tiguous to its territorial sea in order to protect vital interests in its territory or terri-
torial waters.131
Among court opinions it finds support in the celebrated opinion in Church
v. Hubbart in which Mr. Chief Justice Marshall said:
The seizure of a vessel, within the range of its cannon, by a foreign force, is an inva-
sion of that territory, and is a hostile act which it is its duty to repel. But its [the
state's] power to secure itself from injury may certainly be exercised beyond the
limits of its territory. Upon this principle, the right of a belligerent to search a
neutral vessel on the high seas, for contraband of war, is universally admitted ....
[S]o too, a nation has a right to prohibit any commerce with its colonies. Any attempt
to violate the laws made to protect this right, is an injury to itself, which it may pre-
vent, and it has a right to use the means necessary for its prevention. 13 2
Though the language is broad enough to be interpreted as admitting
a right of protection from any injury, it may also be understood that Mr.
Chief Justice Marshall was simply talking about the right to protect
commerce, which was already established and admitted.18 3 Under this
130. See McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea, 49
Am. J. Int'l L. 356 (1955). "From the perspective of realistic description, the international
law of the sea is not a mere static . . . process . . . . It is . . . a process of continuous
interaction, of continuous demand and response, in which decision-makers of particular
nation states unilaterally put forward claims of the most diverse and conflicting character
to the use of the world's seas, and in which other decision-makers, external to the demand-
ing state and including both national and international officials, weigh and appraise these
competing claims in terms of the interests of the world community and of the rival claim.
ants, and ultimately accept or reject them." Id. at 356-57.
131. Hydeman & Berman 236.
132. Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 234-35 (1804).
133. In the same opinion Mr. Chief justice Marshall also said: "These means do not
appear to be limited within any certain marked boundaries, which remain the same, at all
times and in all situations. If they are such as unnecessarily to vex and harass foreign
lawful commerce, foreign nations will resist their exercise. If they are such as are reasonable
and necessary to secure their laws from violation, they will be submitted to." Id. at 235.
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latter interpretation, instead of supporting a blanket right of the coastal
state to exercise jurisdiction over foreign shipping on the high seas
whenever interests located on its territory or in its territorial sea were
reasonably in need of defense, Marshall's opinion may merely admit
the existing right in international law to protect a particular type of
interest, namely commerce. This more restrictive view of the coastal
state's jurisdiction is reflected in the United Nations Secretariat's re-
port to the International Law Commission, attributed to that celebrated
French authority on the law of the sea, Gidel,"' 4 and is, of course,
embodied in the Commission's draft and in article 24 of the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. " '
It seems that the less restrictive view of freedom of the seas is the more
reasonable one and, as such, more likely to represent that degree of
compromise which is necessary to create international law.
Admitting the right of the coastal state to protect any reasonable
interest at any reasonable distance from the shore would also substan-
tiate a great deal of the more extensive claims of the Latin American
states. The Lima Declaration of August 1970130 declares that the limits
of coastal state jurisdiction are to be determined by reasonableness and
geographical, geological, biological and economic criteria. 3 Whether
under the Latin American states' claim to actual jurisdiction over large
expanses of water (anathema to the freedom of the seas) or the theory
of blanket jurisdiction which empowers the coastal states, within a con-
tiguous zone of unlimited extent for the protection of reasonable interests,
to control only activities which leave the status of the waters unchanged
134. M inorandum prsent6 par le Secritariat, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 67, 79,
U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/32 (1950). See generally I L. Oppenheim, International Law 495-96 (8th
ed. 1955).
McDougal & Burke base jurisdiction in contiguous zones on reasonableness, but qualify
it with the requirement of tolerance and acceptance for each interest. McDougal & Burke
584-85. Hydeman & Berman aptly describe this attitude: "While McDougal analyzes the
various contiguous claims which have been asserted and clearly shows a tendency towards
adoption of a rule of reasonableness, he seems to hesitate in asserting that such a rule
exists as a matter of customary international law. Rather he leaves the reader with the
impression that each assertion must be separately tested and may depend on acquiescence."
Hydeman & Berman 234 n.381; see McDougal & Burke, Crisis in the Law of the Sea:
Community Perspective versus National Egoism, 67 Yale LJ. 539 (1958).
135. Report on the Law of the Sea 294-95; 1958 Convention, art. 24.
136. Latin American Meeting on Aspects of the Law of the Sea: Declaration and Resolu-
tions, U.N. Doc. No. A/AC. 138/28 (1970), reprinted in 10 Int'l Legal Materials 207 (1971).
137. Paragraph 2 of the Declaration reads: "The right of the coastal State to establish
the limits of its maritime sovereignty or jurisdiction in accordance with reasonable criteria,
having regard to its geographical, geological and biological characteristics, and the need
to make rational use of its resources ... !1 10 Int'l Legal Materials 207, 208 (1971).
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(i.e., still high seas), the net result-barring differences of nomenclature
-is to vest in coastal states absolute control of ships over vast areas
of ocean. To that extent the two claims coincide and overlap.
But perhaps the Latin American claims, like Marshall's opinion in
Church v. Hubbart, can also be resolved into claims to protect par-
ticular interests whose protection has already become or is about to
become a rule of international law. Thus, although the Lima Declara-
tion still lays claim to full jurisdiction, it does not set numerical limits
and it does single out the protection of some individual interests1 88
The possibility that the Latin American general assertion of jurisdiction
over adjacent waters may be parcelled up into separate assertions for
the protection of particular interests, such as fisheries or freedom from
pollution, has begun to be recognized by the United States in the Com-
ment to the United States Draft Articles on the Territorial Sea, Straits,
and Fisheries, submitted to the United Nations Sea Bed Committee,
which states:
The first article presented by my Government would establish a maximum breadth of
12 miles for the territorial sea .... In most cases where broader jurisdictional claims
have been made, the reasons for those claims were resource-oriented. We believe that
the real concerns of those few states that have claimed broader limits for the terri-
torial sea can be accommodated in the course of the work of this and the other subcom-
mittees.13 9
If this view of the character of the Latin American claims is correct,
then they are moves-like those of Canada-in the emergence of custom-
ary international law concerning the protection of particular interests of
the coastal state, including a pollution-free marine environment.
While the right to control foreign shipping for protection against
potential pollution remains in the twilight zone of emerging law, the
coastal state has always had the right to take all necessary measures to
protect itself when existing pollution has already spread toward its
shores or when there is an imminent danger of such pollution. When the
question resolves itself into taking measures against the actual pollu-
tant matter, i.e., after a ship has sunk and left a spreading oil film, then
the threatened coastal state-or for that matter, any other state-may
undertake mopping up or containing operations on the high seas. There
138. Paragraph 4 of the Declaration specifically added pollution prevention as a right
of the coastal state. "The right of the coastal State to prevent contamination of the waters
and other dangerous and harmful effects that may result from the use, exploration or ex-
ploitation of the area adjacent to its coasts .... " Id.
139. U.S. Draft Articles on Territorial Sea, Straits, and Fisheries Submitted to U.N.
Seabeds Committee, U.N. Doc. A/AC 138/SC. II/L. 4 (1971), reprinted in 65 Dep't State
Bull. 261, 262 (1971).
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are no rules of international law that protect pollutant matter already
in the waters of the high seas. 4 '
If the pollution is caused by a ship or by a fixed or floating installation
under foreign jurisdiction (this latter eventuality may and probably will
come about in the not-too-distant future), and preventive measures, to
be effective, must be taken against that ship or installation (as in the
Torrey Canyon situation), then the rights of the coastal state depend
upon the imminence and dimensions of the threat. These two elements
are of crucial importance because the right to take protective measures
is based on the principle of self-protection or self-defense. Professor
Lauterpacht characterizes protective measures against even natural disas-
ters as self-defense,' 4 ' while Professor Waldock seems to equate the two
terms. 42 However, "self-defense" usually is applied to instances of re-
pelling the use of force by human agents. It is, therefore, more appro-
priate to use the term self-protection. 43
As the basis of the right to avert pollution, self-protection was ex-
plicitly adopted by Juraj Andrassy in his definitive report on maritime
pollution to the 12th Commission of the Institute of International Law.'
140. See the observations of Vladimir Koretsky on the "mar~e noire" in 53 Ann. Inst.
dr. i. (I) 682 (1969).
141. 1 L. Oppenheim, supra note 87, at 298-99 n.3.
142. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International
Law, 81 Recuell des Cours 455, 465-66 (1952 II). "Further, the International Court is
said to have 'firmly rejected the argument of self-protection or self-help' in the Corfu
Channel Case. But the Court in that case ...carefully distinguished between forcible sell-
help which it disapproved and forcible self-protection which it expressly approved. Nor
does there seem to be any reason in principle why the 'inherent right of self-defense'
possessed by a State under general international law should not be exercisable on the high
seas when otherwise a legitimate need for its exercise exists." Id. (italics omitted) (footnote
omitted).
143. See, e.g., the observation of Charles De Visscher in connection with the discussion
of the prevention of maritime pollution by the Institute of International Law at its 1969
session. "De mime, il faut 6viter de parler de 'lqgitime dMfense', non seulement parce que
cette notion a donn6 lieu 6. trop de discussions (cf. celles susdt6es par l'art. 51 de la Charte),
mais surtout parce qu'elle est trop dtroitement ie & lide d'une agression, laquelle n'a rien
b voir id.
"La notion l'accident et celle d'une fonction d'intrt g&i6ral s'accordent, au contraire,
avec la notion de l'autoprotection. Celle-ci est l'ide de base vraiment inh6rente ai l'existence
de l'Etat. Le droit dit de n6cessit6 et celui de l6gitime defense n'en sont que des formes
particulires, drivnes et discutes." 53 Ann. Inst. dr. i. (I) 649, 652 (1969) (italics omitted).
See also id. at 626 (observations of Edward McWhinney); id. at 633 (observations of
Fritz Mimch).
144. 53 Ann. Inst. dr. i. (I) 653 (1969). According to Juraj Andrassy, "Les membres
de la Commission ayant adopt6 le point de vue que le fondement du droit d'intervention dca
l'Etat riverain en cas d'accident survenu se trouve dans la droit d'autoprotection ....
Id. at 660.
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In view of the narrow definition of self-defense in modern international
law and the vagueness of the principle of self-protection, it may already
be superfluous to seek in them the bases for measures against existing
pollution. It may suffice to acknowledge that a state's interest in keeping
its coastline and jurisdictional waters free from pollution from the sea
entities it to take the necessary measures to defend itself when pollution
actually threatens.
Evidence that the undertaking of defensive measures against pollution
actually coming from the high seas has ripened into a separate right can
be seen in the lack of protest when the British destroyed the Torrey
Canyon. It has also been recognized generally for all pollutants in the
declaration of the Institute of International Law adopted at its Edin-
burgh Session in 1969:
Any State facing grave and imminent danger to its coastline or related interests from
pollution or threat of pollution of the sea, following upon an accident on the high
seas, or acts related to such an accident, which may be expected to result in major
consequences, may take such measures as may be necessary to prevent, mitigate or
eliminate such danger .... 145
The same principle is recognized for pollution by oil in the 1969 Brussels
Liability Convention, which states:
Parties to the present Convention may take such measures on the high seas as may be
necessary to prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and imminent danger to their coast-
line or related interests from pollution or threat of pollution of the sea by oil, follow-
ing upon a maritime casualty or acts related to such a casualty, which may reasonably
be expected to result in major harmful consequences. 146
While the 1969 draft convention codifies rules of protection against
imminent pollution following an accident, two other conventions, within
narrow limits and incidental to the regulation of their own subject mat-
ter, permit measures to control future or potential pollution beyond the
twelve-mile limit. According to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Con-
tinental Shelf, the coastal state has the duty to enact and enforce anti-
pollution regulations for the protection of living resources within the
safety zones that it is allowed to maintain around installations for the
exploitation of the natural resources of its continental shelf. 147 While
145. Resolutions Adopted by the Institute at the Session at Edinburgh, III(B)I, 53
Ann. Inst. dr. i. (II) 375, 383 (1969).
146. International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of
Oil Pollution Casualties, art. 1(1), done Nov. 29, 1969, reprinted in 9 Int'l Legal Materials
25 (1970).
147. Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. 5(2), supra note 43, states: "Subject to the
provisions of paragraphs 1 and 6 of this article, the coastal State is entitled to construct and
maintain or operate on the continental shelf installations and other devices necessary for its
exploration and exploitation of its natural resources, and to establish safety zones around
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the explicit duty to enact such regulations is confined to safety zones,
the implied right and duty to enact anti-pollution rules for the entire
area of the continental shelf under national jurisdiction stems from the
right of the coastal state to exploit the continental shelf. Since only the
coastal state can exploit its continental shelf resources, it follows that
it can protect operations undertaken for that purpose and that it has
the duty and the responsibility to prevent adverse effects on the interests
of other states arising from these operations. Article 5(1) of the con-
vention, which states:
The exploration of the continental shelf and the exploitation of its natural resources
must not result in any vnjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing or the con-
servation of the living resources of the sea, nor result in any interference with funda-
mental oceanographic or other scientific research carried out with the intention of open
publication.148
may be interpreted as giving the coastal state authority and imposing on
it the duty to control pollution from operations for the exploitation of
the continental shelf149 and, at the same time, as setting limits on the
right to enact anti-pollution rules for the protection of these operations.
The coastal state may properly exclude foreign ships from sailing through
the threatened area, since this would not be "unjustified interference with
navigation." However, the convention does not give the right to arrest
and punish an offending foreign ship, except perhaps for violations of
regulations in safety zones, in which the coastal state may take "all
appropriate measures."
To the extent that the right to enact anti-pollution measures is implied
in the sovereign rights of the coastal state to explore the continental shelf
which are embodied in articles 1 to 3 of the convention, it has become
part of customary international law. According to the Court of Inter-
national Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,1 0 these three
articles have at least acquired such status."' It may be that coastal states
such installations and devices and to take in those zones measures necessary for their protec-
tion." The convention also states: "The coastal State is obliged to undertake, in the safety
zones, all appropriate measures for the protection of the living resources of the sea from
harmful agents." Id., art. 5(7).
148. Id., art. 5(1) (emphasis added).
149. This duty is explicitly imposed by article 25 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on
the High Seas. See Convention on the High Seas, art. 25.
150. [1969] I.CJ. 3.
151. Id. at 39. The court stated: "This expectation is, in principle, fulfilled by Article
12 of the Geneva Continental Shelf Convention, which permits reservations to be made
to all the articles of the Convention 'other than to Articles 1 to 3 inclusive'-these three
Articles being the ones which, it is clear, were then regarded as reflecting, or as crystallizing,
received or at least emergent rules of customary international law relative to the con-
tinental shelf, amongst them the question of the seaward extent of the shelf; the juridical
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possess this right independently not only of the convention, but per-
haps even of any customary rules (except to the extent that customary
international law is the basis of a state's jurisdiction over its territory),
because the continental shelf is the prolongation of a state's territory and,
as such, under state territorial jurisdiction."5 2
In the 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the
Living Resources of the High Seas, the coastal state was given a limited
right to enact anti-pollution measures for the protection of all living
resources adjacent to its shores.15 3 It may impose conservation measures,
which imply protection against pollution, when negotiations with the
states concerned have not led to an agreement within six months and
the need is urgent and has been scientifically established.1' These mea-
sures are valid only pending final settlement by a special commission. 1 5
Furthermore, even within this limited scope, anti-pollution regulations
would apply solely to nations that fish in particular areas, and probably
then only to their fishing boats and fishing methods, since the convention
speaks generally about conservation measures by and for nations engaged
in fishing in the place where conservation is needed.1 10 As in the Con-
tinental Shelf convention, violation of anti-pollution regulations and, for
that matter, any conservation measure under this convention, would not
entitle the coastal state to any stronger action than exclusion of the
offending vessel from its fishing grounds, except on the strength of a
specific agreement. In order to override the protection afforded ships
character of the coastal State's entitlement; the nature of the rights exercisable; the kind
of natural resources to which these relate; and the preservation intact of the legal status
as high seas of the waters over the shelf, and the legal status of the superjacent air-space."
Id.
152. Id. at 22. The court stated: "More important is the fact that the doctrine of the
just and equitable share appears to be wholly at variance with what the Court enter-
tains no doubt is the most fundamental of all the rules of law relating to the continental
shelf, enshrined in Article 2 of the 1958 Geneva Convention, though quite independent of
it,--namely that the rights of the coastal State in respect of the area of continental shelf
that constitutes a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea exist
ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and as an extension of
it in an exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting
its natural resources. In short, there is here an inherent right. In order to exercise It, no
special legal process has to be gone through, nor have any special legal acts to be per-
formed. Its existence can be declared ... but does not need to be constituted. Furthermore,
the right does not depend on its being exercised." Id. (italics omitted).
153. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas,
done April 29, 1958, [1966] 1 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969 (effective March 20, 1966).
154. Id., art. 7.
155. Id.
156. Id., arts. 4-7.
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by the principle of the freedom of the seas, there must be an explicit
and specific conventional or customary rule.
V. CONCLUSION
Because marine pollution has only recently been recognized for what
it is-a problem of global dimensions and extreme complexity-inter-
national law has not yet evolved specific rules for dealing with it. This
does not mean that international law ignores marine pollution; it means
only that the prohibition of pollution must be sought in the general rules
pertaining to the use of the sea. These rules are necessarily vague and
can be made workable only by interpreting them as almost totally per-
mitting or totally forbidding pollution. However, once it is accepted
that the duty not to pollute the high seas exists in international law, trans-
gression of this duty must invoke the responsibility of states and private
enterprise.
Even so, it is one thing to assign this broad responsibility and quite
another to proceed effectively against the polluters in particular instances.
Lack of appropriate substantive municipal law, coupled with constitutional
bars to the direct application of international law, may preclude suits in
municipal courts.157 An international forum may also be denied to the
plaintiff state for lack of standing on the ground that the injury was not
to its individual interests but to those of the international community-a
separate, abstract entity-or to mankind as a whole. 5
Nevertheless, explicit recognition of the need to protect the marine
environment in recent projects of international conventions"ra indicates
157. In addition, procedural obstacles may preclude bringing a suit in the courts of
the polluter's state. See, e.g., Read, The Trail Smelter Dispute, 1 Can. Y.B. Int'l L. 213, 222
(1963), wherein the author said: "The ordinary course followed by persons damaged by
fumes from a smelter was to bring a suit in the courts of justice for damages and for an
injunction to prevent future damage. This, however, was not satisfactory for the claimant
in the State of Washington. It was the general opinion of the lawyers concerned at the
time that the British Columbian courts would be compelled to refuse to accept jurisdiction
in suits based on damage to land situated outside of the province. Apart, therefore, from
the practical difficulty confronting some hundreds of claimants in bringing suits in a
foreign forum, there was the moral certainty that they would lose."
158. See, e.g., South West Africa Cases, [19661 I.CJ. 4, 32.
159. See, e.g., United States: Draft Convention on the Regulation of Ocean Dumping,
June, 1971, reprinted in 10 Int'l Legal Materials 1021 (1971). "No Party shall issue
permits for the transportation of such material for dumping if the dumping thereof in
the ocean would unreasonably degrade or endanger human health, welfare or amenities,
or the marine environment, ecological systems, or existing or future economic use of the
ocean." Id., art. I1(b), at 1023. See also United States Draft of U.N. Convention on Inter-




that the interest of individual states in the marine environment will be
protected by law. While progress is being made along these lines, un-
certainties remain, even when there is demonstrable injury to a state's
material interests, as to the degree of responsibility with which the of-
fender shall be burdened. The trend seems to be toward strict liability,
whether on the part of the state or of private enterprise and whether the
pollution derives from within the state's boundaries or originates on the
high seas. 10
Because of the vagueness and uncertainty of the rules of international
law concerning pollution of the high seas, some states have begun to claim
jurisdiction to control pollution outside the twelve-mile limit 1 ' estab-
lished by the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone.162 Special-purpose jurisdiction of coastal states for an
indeterminate distance from the shore has numerous precedents 00 and,
although it might be an exaggeration to declare that such jurisdiction
for pollution control has become a rule of customary law, the conflicting
claims and counterclaims look very much like the birthpangs of a custom-
ary rule.'
Conventional law has managed to develop fairly precise rules for civil
liability in the case of oil spills from ships, but it has been much less
effective with other types of pollution and generally has dealt with the
problem in piecemeal fashion. When a particular kind of pollution becomes
sufficiently noticeable and acquires sufficient nuisance value, a con-
vention is concluded. Thus, in step with the post-World War II develop-
ment of large tankers, the 1954 Convention on Oil Pollution was con-
cluded"6 5 and then supplemented by two further conventions in 1969.10
When nuclear vessels began to ply the seas, a convention followed in
1962 . 167 Provisions dealing with pollution from seabed exploitation were
160. See notes 91, 95 & 96 supra and accompanying text.
161. E.g., An Act to Amend the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, Can. Rev. Stat,
c. 45 (1st Supp. 1971).
162. 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, art. 24.
163. See generally Opinion of Dr. Hessel E. Yntema, Professor of Law, University of
Michigan, on the Validity of Hovering Legislation in International Law, Submitted by the
Treasury Department in Support of H.R. 5496, Hearings on H.R. 5496 Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 82 (1935), which reviews the past and
present legislative attempts to deal with the problems of "hovering vessels."
164. See note 131 supra and accompanying text.
165. 1954 Convention, supra note 13.
166. Brussels Convention, supra note 61; International Convention Relating to Inter.
vention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, reprinted in 9 Int'l Legal
Materials 25 (1970).
167. Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, reprinted in 57 Am.
J. Int'l L. 268 (1963). However, as far as this writer is aware, the convention is still not
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included in the United States draft convention of 1971 which dealt with
the seabed regime in general,168 and now that dumping has begun to at-
tract attention, the United States has proposed a separate convention on
dumping and the resultant pollution, to be considered by the projected
1973 Conference on the Law of the Sea."0 9 While the draft seabed con-
vention seems to be well worked out, the proposals for control of dumping
are totally inadequate and do not do justice to this important source of
pollution. It can only be hoped that the 1973 Conference will build more
adequate rules on these proposals.
Although there are many sources of marine pollution, the problem itself
is a unitary one and, in its fundamental aspects at least, should be dealt
with as such. Thus, while particular conventions may be retained for
particular types of pollution, general provisions-whether in a separate
pollution convention or in a general convention on the regime of the
seas-should establish as a minimum the clear duty of states and in-
dividuals not to pollute and should provide for the promulgation of sea-
water quality standards. Since it envisages an international authority and
entrusts that authority, inter alia, with the promulgation of anti-pollution
regulations, the United States' proposal for a seabed convention might
serve as a framework for the machinery necessary to create these
standards. 70 However, the jurisdiction of this seabed agency is limited
to the projected international area of the seabed,' 7 ' and pollution does
not recognize such jurisdictional niceties. To be effective, standards must
be uniformly established for all ocean waters.
Though the mere creation of such an authority would of itself be a
great achievement, the gap between power to create standards and their
actual creation is very wide and there are immense obstacles of a scientific
and technical nature to be overcome. The problem of implementing
standards is perhaps equally complex, but once in existence they would
immediately provide criteria for national and international adjudication.
Perhaps the most effective way to enforce them would be to give states
and the international authority power to bring states responsible for
pollution before an international special tribunal. The tribunal and the
in force because of lack of ratification by the two states that possess nuclear vessels-the
United States and the U.S.S.R. See also Goldie, Book Review, 1 J. Mar. L. & Commerce
155, 163 n.23 (1969).
168. United States Draft of U.N. Convention on the International Seabed Area, supra
note 48.
169. United States: Draft Convention on the Regulation of Ocean Dumping, reprinted
in 10 Int'l Legal Materials 1021 (1971).
170. United States Draft of United Nations Convention on the International Seabed




authority envisaged in the United States' seabed proposal are to have
some of this power, so the pioneering work has already been done.172
It is probably too early to expect that the international tribunal, if and
when it is established, would be given jurisdiction to hear the pollution
complaints of individuals, but it should at least be able to hear complaints
brought by states on behalf of individuals without the requirement of
exhaustion of local remedies. Since it is very likely that only states would
be sued before the special international tribunal, they should unequivo-
cally be made responsible, despite a lack of fault on their part, for pol-
lution caused by ships flying their flags as well as by individuals and
enterprises under their jurisdiction. 7 '
While the working out of acceptable standards is crucial for pollution
control, it is only realistic to recognize that even if standards are accepted
in principle, it will take a long time before they are established. In the
interim, the international tribunal must decide in each particular case
whether actual pollution or the threat of pollution has occurred. To
facilitate the tribunal's task, and also to permit greater uniformity within
the decision-making process, general categories of factors to be taken into
account should be indicated-e.g., the geography and hydrography of
the area in question; climatological conditions; quality of the receiving
waters; actual or potential effect of pollution on the flora and fauna; and
the degree of past, present and future utilization of the area. 7 4
It would be premature to expect that pollution be made an inter-
national crime for the prevention and suppression of which public vessels
of any state, regardless of flag, would be allowed to board a polluting
ship and bring it to the nearest port for punishment. At present such
jurisdiction exists only in the case of piracy' 75-and yet the present-
day polluter is more dangerous to the order of the oceans than the
pirate has ever been.
172. Id., art. 23, at 1052; id., art. 46, at 1060; id., art. 50, at 1061.
173. See notes 85-96 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of state responsibility
for pollution caused by individuals.
174. The International Law Association similarly enumerated the factors which should
be taken into account in determining the equitable share in beneficial use of the waters of
the international river basin to which a co-basin state is entitled. Helsinki Rules on the
Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, art. 5, in The International Law Association:
Report of the Fifty-Second Conference 477, 488 (1967).
175. See Multilateral Law of the Sea: Convention on the High Seas, done April 29, 1958,
art. 19, [1962) 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
